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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
W. S. HATCH CO., a Utali corporation,
Petitioner,
-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT,
DONALD HACKING, STEWART
M. HANSON, ITS COMMISSIONERS; THE DENVER AND RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
CO., a Delaware corporation; THE
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM~
p ANY, a Utah corporation; and GUY
PRICHARD, dba Guy Prichard
Transfer,

Case No. 8182

Respondent.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before the Supreme Court on a Writ
of Review for the purpose of reviewing the proceedings,
findings and report and order of the Public Service Commission of etah in the above captioned matter. Petition
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for rehearing was filed by petitioner with the Public
Service Commission on March 5, 1954. On l\Iarch 12, 1954,
the Public Service Commission issued its orde,r denying
said petition for rehearing and on April 9, 1954, petitioner filed its petition for a Writ of Review with the
Supreme Court, and on April 9, 1954, said "\Vrit was issued.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
W. S. Hatch Co., petitioner herein, is a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the State
of Utah. On August 19, 1953, petitioner filed its application with the Public Service Commission of Utah for a
certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing petitioner to operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle
for the transportation of acid (including used and contaminated acids) in bulk, in tank vehicles over irregular
routes from and to all points and places within tlie State
of Utah not then served by applicant under its existing
authority. At the time said application was filed applicant held authority to transport acid as a common carrier,
in bulk, in tank vehicles for hire over irregular routes
between Woods Cross, Utah, on the one hand and all
points and places within Salt Lake County on the other
as well as to, fr01n and between all points and places in
Salt Lake County and four-tenths (.4) of one mile beyond the limits of Salt Lake County and into Tooele
County as well as to, from and between all points and
places within Salt Lake County. (R. 13)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
After due notice, hearing on said application was
had on December 1 and December 2, 1953, before the
Public Service Commission at its offices in Salt Lake
City. The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.,
the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and Guy Prichard,
djbja Guy Prichard Transfer, hereinafter referred to as
Prichard, appeared at the hearing protesting petitioner's
application.
Petitioner challenged the right of protestant Prichard to appear in this case (R. 106) on the grounds that
Prichard's authority did not cover the transportation
of acid and for that reason he had no right to participate
in the hearing. After some argument the Commission
ruled that Prichard had sufficient interest to participate
in the hearing, but reserved the ruling on the question of
the construction of his authority to determine whether
or not it included the transportation of acid.
Commissioner Hacking made the following statement
as to the necessity of construing Prichard's rights in
order to determine the issues in the instant application
(R. 111).

"COM. HACKING: Of course, in testing the
need for the services proposed by the Applicant
in this case, I suppose the fact as to whether or
not Pritchard offers a service in a part of the territory covered by the application would be very
material to the consideration of the whole question."
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The evidence shows that petitioner rnaintains a large
number of tractors, trucks and tank truck equipment,
the detail of which is reflected on petitioner's equipment
list (Ex. 1, R. 12). The equ~pment owned and operated by
petitioner for the transportation of acid in bulk consists
of three semi-trailers, one full four-wheel trailer a tank
truck and various trucks and tractors for use in 'connection therewith (R. 12, 87).
Mr. Carl 0. McFarland testified in behalf of the
Solar Corporation in Ogden, Utah, that his company
manufactures storage batteries and uses 200-250 tons of
sulphuric acid per year (R.165). He testified further that
storage facilities maintained by his con1pany for acid
were such that it became necessary to deplete their inventory to a dangerously low point before they had capacity to take a full railroad carload (R. 166). Railroad
tank cars have a capacity of approximately 6,000, 8,000 or
10,000 gallons, which amounts to a minimum of twice the
capacity of a tank truck andjor trailer load (R .. 88).
He also testified that rail service is slow and that delivery by raiload necessitated the n1aintenance of a larger
inventory than would be the case if his company had truck
service available to supplement rail service (R. 167, 169).
He further testified that the combination of truck and rail
service would afford his company an opportunity for improving safety, inventory economics and savings on
pumping expense. The Commission n1ade a finding in
accordance with the testimony outlined above (R. 24) and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
based on such finding the Commission granted petitioner
authority to transport acid between Salt Lake County
and Weber County (R. 27). Of this finding and order
petitioner makes no complaint.
Mr. Harold Ellison, the production manager for
Layton Sugar Company, whose plant is located in Layton,
Davis County, Utah, gave similar testimony regarding
the need for truck service for the transportation of acid
to the Layton Sugar Company plant. The Commission
likewise found that public convenience and necessity required the services of petitioner for the transportation
of acid from Salt Lake County to all points and places
in Davis County (R. 24, 27). Of this finding and order
petitioner makes no complaint.
Testimony was given by witness John A. Riddle, the
assistant director of the Processing Division of the
Atomic Energy Commission, Grand Junction, Colorado,
to the effect that sulphuric acid was used in treating
uranium ore by what is known as the carbonate or soda
ash leeching process (R. 212); and that as a result of the
tremendous increase in the exploration, mining and production of uranium ore throughout the Colorado Plateau,
which extends to the Henry Mountains in Garfield and
vVayne Counties, as well as in the Marysvale area in
Puite County (R. 210) and in the Southeastern part
of the State and the Big Indian area in San Juan
and Grand Counties

(R. 215), the consumption of

sulphuric acid in the southeastern part of the State of
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Utah would increase from approximately three to five
tons per day, or an average of four tons per day (R. 212)
to approximately 25 to 50 tons per day at the Monticello
Processing Plant (R. 213). A tank truck trailer can
transport approximately 22 tons of acid in one load (R.
88). Thus the increased production at the :Monticello
plant would necessitate approximately two loads per day
compared to the present use of acid requiring approxiIna tely one load per week, or a consumption at Monticello alone of approximately 14 times the present use.
Mr. Riddle also testified that it will be necessary in the
very near future to construct a new processing mill to
process uranium ores now being mined in the Big Indian
area in San Juan and Grand Counties, and that if such a
mill is not built by private concerns the Atomic Energy
Commission will build it (R. 216-217). He further testified that the acid consumption at such mill would amount
to 100 to 150 tons of acid per day, or five to seven truck
loads per day (R. 218). Furthermore, this witness testified that the consumption would be sporadic, thus requiring even greater demands for transportation at times
of peak consun1ption. It is undisputed that there is no rail
service to Monticello or to San Juan County or beyond
Thompson, in Grand County. The only source for new or
unused acid in the State of Utah and to which the outlined
testimony refers is the Garfield Chemical Company located at Garfield, Salt Lake County (R. 94). The small
amount of acid presently being used at the Monticello
plant is now being transported by rail from Garfield to
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Thompson and transported by truck from Thompson to
.Monticello. There are various sources throughout the
state for used or spent acid (R. 169-171).
Mr. John W. Blackburn, the purchasing agent and
mines auditor of the Vanadium Mines Corporation of
America, testified on behalf of that company as to the
present and contemplated consumption of acid at the,
processing mill located at White Canyon or Hite, in San
Juan County. He stated that his company was planning
to expand the operation of such processing mill from
approximately 79 tons of acid to approximately 400 tons
of acid per month (R. 237). The acid presently used at
the White Canyon Mill is being transported by Vanadium
Corporation of America in its own equipment. Mr. Blackburn stated that his company desired the services of a
common carrier (R. 237) and would use the services of
the petitioner herein if authority for such transportation
was granted (R. 238). He further stated that Prichard
had delivered one load of acid for his company, and that
he was informed that Prichard refused to make further
deliveries and for that reason he was not using Prichard's
service at the present time (R. 232-236).
Paul Blanchard of Salt Lake City, who is employed
by the Utah Power & Light Co. as a steam production
engineer, testified that his company will require approximately 2,500 pounds of acid per day at the steam-electric
generating plant now being constructed at Castle Gate,
Utah (R. 153). Mr. Blanchard testified that availability
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of both rail and truck service was necessary because of
limited storage facilities and unusual problems in connection with the te-rrain in Price Canyon where the plant
will be located (R. 153, 154). The Commission made a
finding that public convenience and necessity required
truck transportation of acid to Carbon County (R. 23).
It further found that public convenience and necessity
required additional truck transportation to the southeastern part of the State (R. 25). Notwithstanding such
findings, the Commission denied petitioner's application
as it related to these areas. The Commission's report
and order was issued on February 23, 1954, granting petitioner authority to transport acid from Salt Lake County
to points and places in Davis and Weber Counties, and
in all other respects it denied petitioner's application.
STATEl\1ENT OF' POINTS
POINT I.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE
RIGHTS OF GUY PRICHARD TRANSFER TO INCLUDE AUTHORITY TO TRANSPORT ACID IN BULK IN TANK
TRUCKS.

POINT II.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S APPLICATION AS TO ALL POINTS AND PLACES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH EXCEPT DAVIS AND WEBER
COUNTIES.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE
RIGHTS OF GUY PRICHARD TRANSFER TO INCLUDE AUTHORITY TO TRANSPORT ACID IN BULK IN TANK
TRUCKS.

The report and order issued by the Commission contains the following language (R. 25-26):
"Guy Prichard Transfer has for many years
transported acid, in bulk, from the railhead at or
near Thompsons, Utah, to the plant at Monticello,
Utah, and has storage facilities on the railroad
trackage and special tank truck equipment suitable
for this operation. Prichard formerly transported
bulk acid on a contract carrier permit. Upon the
issuance of the certificate of convenience and
necessity which Prichard now holds, the contract
carrier permit issued to Prichard was cancelled
under the theory that the transportation of acid
in bulk would fall within the commodity description contained in the certificate of convenience and
necessity issued Prichard. In determining the
issues in this matter we find that Prichard has authority to transport acid, in bulk, in tank trucks,
specially designed and equipped for that purpose.
The acid tank trailer operated by Prichard is now
being used only part-time for the transportation
of acid from Thompsons to Monticello, Utah, and
is otherwise idle. In addition to the acid hauling
equipment which Prichard now owns and operates,
he has other equipment which might be used in
connection with acid tank trailers."
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The following footnote is contained on page 5 of the
Commission's report and order (R. 26):
Footnote 1: "The question as to whether
the transportation of acid, in bulk, is included in
the authority issued to Prichard by certificate of
convenience and necessity No. 741 was made an
issue in this case. Since there may be some question as to the language of said certificate in this
regard and since Prichard has been transporting
acid in bulk since 1946 under the assumption that
his authority covered such transportation, it may
be necessary for the Commission in a separate
order to specifically include in the certificate of
convenience and necessity No. 741 authority to
transport acid, in bulk, in special tank truck equipment."
The pertinent parts of the authority under which
Prichard operates, i.e., certificate of convenience and
necessity No. 741, are as follows (R. 20):
"To operate as a com1non motor carrier hy
motor vehicle for the transportation of:
1. Commodities which by reason of their size,
shape, weight, origin, or destination require equipment of (or) service of a character not regularly
furnished by regular common carriers at the regular line rates which commodities shall be such as,
.
but shall not 'be limited to the following: Gasoline
tanks, Boilers, Pipes, and Tubing to be used in
connection therewith; Cable, Bridge, or Structural
Iron or Steel; Concrete l\Iixers, Culverts, Explosives, Grading and Road Equipment, Harvestors
and Threshers; Locomotives, Machinery and
Drag-line outfits; Piling, Pipe, Pole Line Construction Material; Telephone or Telegraph Poles;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Rails, S1nokestacks; and Heavy Timbers; Machinery, Materials, Supplies and equipment incidental
to or used in, the construction, development, oper~tion and maintenance of facilities for the discovery,' development, and production of natural
gas and petroleum or minerals.

...

2. Commodities in connection with the transporting of which is rendered a special service in
preparing such commodities for shipment or setting up after delivery or otherwise rendering a
needed service not a part of the ordinary act of
transporting and not now regularly furnished by
other regular common carriers for the regular
line rates.
3. Campsite equipment, camp supplies, fixtures and accessories which shall be transported
to camps or to construction sites or locations.
4. All parts, supplies, equipment and appurtenances necessarily connected or to be connected
or used with any of the articles described in paragraphs one and two, whenever such parts, supplies, equipment and appurtenances are a part of
the same movement.
To perform the services defined between
points in Utah where the origin or destination of
the movement is in Uintah, Duchesne, Carbon,
Emery, Wayne, Grand, or San Juan Counties,
on call, over irregular routes."
The Commission apparently recognizes the fact that
to construe the above quoted language to include transportation of acid, in bulk, does violence to the English
language, and thus reference is made in the Commission's
order, to some contract carrier permit which Prichard
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formerly held. There is not one shred of evidence in the
entire record with regard to what was contained in that
contract carrier permit nor from which points it authorized Prichard to haul. There is nothing in the record
to indicate the commodities which such permit authorized
Prichard to haul, nor the contract or contracts under
which the haul was n1ade. The only reference in the record to such permit is made by Commissioner Hacking
(R. 107) as follows:
"As I think it (I) stated once before in another case, my recollection is that Prichard held
some acid hauling-contract acid hauling authority. He prosecuted an application for specialized
hauling as a common carrier, and the Commission
in issuing-and the Commission issued some common carrier authority in that case, and when the
common carrier authority was issued his specialized hauling, the contract authority held by Prichard was cancelled, under the assumption that the
common carrier authority issued included the contract hauling, and it is my understanding that
that has been the way the Commission has treated
Prichard's authority since that time."
Certainly this statement by a Commissioner, sitting
in judgment on this case, as to what his recollection was
as to some contract carrier authority which Prichard did
not see fit to make a part of this record, cannot be considered evidence of any nature.
The effect of the Commission's order is to grant
Prichard authority to transport acid between any and all
points in the State of Utah where the point of origin or
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destination of the movement is in Uintah, Duchesne, Carbon, Emery, Wayne, Grand or SanJuan Counties, that is,
the Commission has granted Prichard authority to haul
acid throughout the entire area covered by his authority,
which can be to any point within the state. This it does
based upon a recollection of a pre-e·xisting contract carrier permit which has been cancelled for many years.
Even if there were some evidence in the record regarding
this contract carrier permit it certainly could not be the
basis for extensive common carrier rights without an
additional showing on proper application by Prichard.
A contract carrier is defined in Section 54-6-1, U.C.A.
1953 as follows:
"'Contract motor carrier of property' means
any person engaged in the transportation by
motor vehicle of property for hire and not included in the term common motor carrier of property
as hereinbefore defined."
The same section defines a common carrier as follows:
" 'Common motor carrier of property' means
any person who holds himself out to the public
as willing to undertake for hire to transport by
motor vehicle from place to place, the property
of others who may choose to employ him."
This court in the case
Service Commission, et al.,
defined a contract carrier
dividual contracts for each

of McCarthy et al. v. Public
111 Utah 489, 184 P. 2d 220,
as one who entered into injob and did not hold himself
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out to the public generally. The court quoted with approval the definition of a contract carrier found in
United States Code Annotated, Title 49, Section 303 (a)
(15) as follows:
"The term 'contract carrier by motor vehicle'
means any person which, under individual contracts or agreements, engages in the transportation ... by motor vehicle of passengers or property ... for compensation."
In the case of Lowe, et al. v. Public Service Commission, et al., 116 Utah 376, 210 P. 2d 558, this court again
construed the term contract carrier and held that separate corporations which entered into an agreement to
form an association to transport their own separate
goods were contract carriers.

A contract carrier permit merely authorizes one to
transport goods under a specific contract or agreement
with a specific person, corporation or association. It is
not and cannot be the basis for cmmnon carrier authority.
The error of the Commission is more clearly pointed up
when it is remembered that there is absolutely no evidence in this record as to the commodity, contract, person,
origin or destination supposedl~r contained in the alleged contract carrier permit formerly held by Prichard
whirh is the basis of the Commission's order.
The question now arises as to whether the language
of the certificate of convenience and necessit~r held h;.'
Prichard and hereinabove quoted can be fairly construed
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to include the transportation of acid in bulk in tank truck
vehicles. Prichard's counsel maintains that it does. Although the Commission chooses to base the extension of
Prichard's authority on the vague contract carrier rights
before mentioned, Prichard's counsel contends that the
existing certificate of convenience and necessity includes
such authority as is shown frmn the following quotation
from the record (R. 106).
"MR. BOYLE: If the Commission please, I
raise a question as to the right of Prichard Transfer to appear in this case.
"As I read their rights, I don't see that they
include acid at all. I understand that they are making one isolated haul, but I don't even know under
what authority they make that haul-but I challenge their right to protest in this hearing and
maintain that their rights do not cover the transportation of acid.
"MR. FINLINSON: Well, we submit it, Gentlemen. We have been over this in previous hearings. We submit that we are entitled under our
authority to haul acid in the area we are permitted
to haul, and we are here properly as protestants,
and we submit it.
"COM. HACKING: Well, what is your pof'ition on that~ We did discuss this in another case,
but it hasn't been discussed fully in this case, has
it~

")JR. FINLINSON: Well, our position is
that under our authority we can haul ar:irl, in that
acid requires special equipment, and under our
authority we can ha~tl it.
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"You are familiar with our authoritY I think
'
'
and the broad language of the-with the. approval
of the Commission we have been hauling it since
this authority was issued. (En1phasis added.)
(R. 109, 110) :
"MR. FINLINSON: Gentlemen, I call your
attention to paragraph 2 of his authority:
·
'Commodities in connection with the transporting of which is rendered a special service in
preparing such commodities for shipment or setting up after delivery or otherwise rendering a
needed service not a part of the ordinary act of
transporting and not now regularly furnished by
other regular common carriers for the regular
line rates.'
Now, gentlemen, I submit that that covers the
hauling of acid, and we have been hauling it, and
whatever Mr. Pritchard might have said in any
statement does not limit or restrict his authority,
and the Commission has got to interpret it."
The first paragraph of Prichard's authority gives

him the right to transport:
"Cmnmodities which by reason of their size,
shape, weight, origin or destination require equipment of (or) service of a character not regularly
furnished by regular co nun on carriers at the regular line rates, which commodities shall be such
as, but shall not be li1nited to the following: Gasoline tanks, Boilers, Pipes, and Tubing to be used
in connection therewith; Cable, Bridges, or Structural Iron or Steel; Concrete Mixers, Culverts,
Explosives, Grading and Road Equipment, Harvesters and Threshers; Locomotives, .Machinery
and Drag-line outfits; Piling, Pipe, Pole Line ConSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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struction :Material, Telephone or Telegraph Poles;
Rails; Smokestacks; and Heavy Timbers; Machinery, Materials, Supplies and equipment, incidental to, or used in the construction, developrnent, operation, and maintenance of facilities
for the discovery, development, and production
of natural gas and petroleum or minerals."
We submit that under the familiar rule of ejusdum
generis the most compelling argument that acid in bulk
in tank truck vehicles is not included within this paragraph consists of a mere reading thereof. Each and
every one of the commodities mentioned in this paragraph
is a large, bulky, heavy piece of solid equiprnent which
requires special cranes, winches and rigs for the loading
and unloading thereof. When Prichard's authority was
originally granted it was the subject of an appeal to this
court. See Uintah Freight Lines, et al. v. Pu-blic

Serv~ce

Commission, et al., ______ Utah ------, 223 P. 2d 408. The follo·wing quotations taken frmn this court's opinion in that
case indicate the nature of Prichard's authority as construed hy the court, Commission, counsel and Prichard
himself:
"Mr. Prichard, who resides in Price, advertises and holds himself out in eastern Utah as a
carrier of heavy commodities and equipment. He
owns six trucks equipped with winches and six
trailers ... Prichard has loaded arnd hauled commodities weighing as much as twenty-five tons on
one of h~s trailers.
'*'

* *
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"One Mike Gamber ... testified in behalf of
Prichard's application. He testified that while it
had been necessary to employ the services of a
carrier of heavy commodities and equipment only
once in the past twelve years, it would be a matter
of convenience" to have Prichard's service. * * *
"J. L. Larsen ... testified that (he) ... had
the need occasionally for the services of a carrier
of heavy commodit~es and that it would be a
matter of convenience for the company to employ
a person in Price * * *
"George Jackson ... testified ... that he occasionally has the need of the services of a carrier
of hea,vy commodities and equipment in connection
with his business and that it would be convenient
for him to be able to employ Prichard . . . "
(Emphasis added.)
Reference is made to the text of the entire opinion
in this case whereby it is most evident that everyone
concerned construed the authority which he had sought
and obtained from the Commission, as being for the
transportation of heavy equipment. This authority is
the identical authority now held by Prichard and at this
late date construed by the Cmnmission as including acid.
There is little authority that can be cited to show
the gross error in such a construction. \Yha t the Commission has done is to enlarge the rights of Prichard
based upon a showing 1nade b)~ petitioner. In the recent
case of Peterson v. Public Ser·vice Commission, ______ Utah
______ , 266 P. 2d -1-!J~, this court reversed an order of the
Public Serviee Commission wl1icl1 attempted to eonstrue
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the phrase between Salt Lake City and Provo as excluding transportation from Salt Lake City to Provo. In that
case as in this one the Commission attempted to construe
this authority in a collateral proceeding. An attempt was
made to justify the Commission's action by citing the
time-honored rule that the Supreme Court will not disturb a finding of fact made by the Commission on competent evidence. This court properly pointed out that
such a construction of authority was not a finding of fact
but a conclusion of law and stated that:
''If it were permissible to go back of the language and contradict its plain terms, intolerable
confusion and uncertainty would exist with rega,rd
to operating rights ... " (Emphasis added.)
The court further stated:
"Such attempted refinement does violence to
the ordinary meaning of words."
The Commission's action in the case at bar parallels
its action in the Peterson case, supra. It is an attempt
to vary the plain, unmnbiguous language of Prichard's
certificate in a collateral proceeding without justification
whatever.
Paragraph :2 of Prichard's authority gives him the
right to transport
"Commodities in connection with the transportation of which is rendered a special service in
preparing such commodities for shiprnent or setting up after delivery or otherwise rendering a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
needed service not a part of the ordinary act of
transporting and not now regularly furnished hy
other regular common carriers for the regular line
rates."
First of all, this paragraph must be read in connection with paragraph 1 as it relates to "heavy equipment.''
Certainly there is no special service necessary on behalf
of the carrier in preparing acid for shipment or in setting
it up after delivery, nor is there any other special service to be rendered not a part of the ordinary act of
transportation. Acid is loaded and unloaded by the use
of a common ordinary air hose inserted in the tank containing acid, the pressure from which forces the acid to
flow out of the tank into the receptacle receiving the
acid. This air hose is in all instances furnished by the
shipper or the consignee (R. 176, 177). It is under no
stretch of the imagination a special service rendered by
the carrier. There is less service rendered in connection
with loading or unloading acid than in the case of loading
or unloading boxes of canned goods or any other ordinary
commodity. There is absolutely no senTice rendered
by the carrier in preparing the cmnmodity for shipment
since this is done by Garfield Chemical Company. Prichard's counsel atte1npted to elicit from witness Hatch
testimony that acid equipment was special equipment
by the following questions: (R. 120)

"Q. Now, Mr. Hatch, referring to Exhibit 1, you
have your first item that you stated was used
in the transportation of acid is your item
15-A, which is described as a Utility semitrailer; is that correct 1
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A.

Q.

Yes.
Now, describe that equipment, if you will,
please~

A.

Well, that is a 3500 gallon tank, steel pressure
tank, with pressure valves on it for the purpose of hauling acid, sitting on a Utility-in
fact Utility Built it-on a Utility trailer. The
utility part is the underneath part, the carriage part.

Q.

The wheels and the

A.

Yes.

Q.

That is specially constructed to haul the tank,
is jt~- for the tank to sit on it1

A.

In this case it was."

frame~

And again (R. 125):

"Q.
A.

And that you had this tank built specially to
haul acid 1
Yes."

And again ( R. 127) :

"Q.
. ..\..

So that you have to have 8pecialized equipment to haul it?
Yes."

This attempt to have the witness Hatch state that
acid equipment is specialized equipment actually has no
bearing on the question. Prichard's authority is limited
to transportation of commodities "in connection with the
transporting of which is rendered a special service in
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preparilng such commodities for shipment or sett,ing up

after delivery or otherwise rendering a needed service.'-'
His authority does not relate to special equip1nent and in
any event does not relate to tank truck equipment. If it
did his authority would allow him to transport gasolim·,
fuel oil, crude oil, road oil, asphalt and all petroleum
products transported in tank trucks, all of which require
the same type of "special equip1nent" needed for the
transportation of acid in bull{. We doubt if even Prichard
would go as far as to make such a contention.
On redirect examination Mr. Hatch clarified what he
meant by "special equipment" (R.141).

"Q. . .. I call your attention to the other equipment that you show on your equipment list.
What is that generally used for other than
this acid equipment~ What do you haul in
it~

A.

We haul gasoline, diesel, light fuels, heavy
fuels, road oil and asphalt.

Q.

And is that all tank truck

A.

Yes.

Q.

And is it specially constructed to comply with
the ICC regulations and the regulations of
the Public Service Commission~

A.

Yes.

equipment~

Q. And would you consider that equipment to be
specialized equipment~
A.

Yes."
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Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Prichard's authority relate
solely to campsite equipment, camp supplies, fixtures
and accessories and supplies and equipment and appurtenances connected with the commodities described in
paragraphs 1 and 2 whenever they are part of the same
movement. There is just as 1nuch justification for construing this language as including acid in bulk in tank
truck vehicles as there is in construing paragraphs 1 and
2 to include such commodity.
We submit that Prichard's authority does not include acid and that the Commission's finding that it does
·whether based upon a contract permit which was not
in evidence or upon a tortured construction of the language itself, is error.
POINT II.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S APPLICATION AS TO ALL POINTS AND PLACES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH EXCEPT DAVIS AND WEBER
COUNTIES.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Commission found
that public convenience and necessity required the services of truck transportation of acid in bulk in tank vehicles in various portions of the state, it denied petitioner's application for such authority except for transportation frmn Salt Lake County to Davis and Weber
Countie~. This action was based upon the erroneous conclusion that Prichard had authority to transport acid im
nLriolls counties throughou.t the state. The error urged in
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this respect is treated under Point No.1. However, in addition to this error we submit that apart frmn a con~true
tion of Prichard's authority the Commission erred in
denying the stated portions of petitioner's application for
two reasons: 1. Even if Prichard's rights specifical1y
included acid he does not rnaintain sufficient equipment
to satisfy the acid transportation needs in this state.
2. Since no rnotor carrier has authority to transport acid
in the State of Utah except the petitioner public convenience and necessity require the granting of petitioner's
application in its entirety.
Mr. Prichard testified on direct examination that he
had only one tank which he could use in the transportation
of acid (R. 257).

"Q.

(By Mr. Finlinson) All right, describe the
equipment which you have that is used in your
acid haul?

A.

Well, at the present time we have a DiamondT 1953 tractor with a 275 Cummings motor,
and I have an acid tank built by the Lang
Company. It is forty-two feet long-or forty
feet long, forty-two inches in diameter. The
capacity is around about 2700 gallons.

Q.

And is that hauled by this Diamond-T tractor?

A.

Yes.

Q.

All right, what else?

A.

That's all we use is that one tank and the
tractor."
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On cross examination l\Tr. Prichard admitted that
the tractor was used for heavy equipment hauling and
was not limited to acid transportation (R. 265).

"BY .J1R. BOYLE:

Q.

:Mr. Prichard, this money that you have got
invested in acid equipment is solely the money
you have in your tank; is that right1

A.

Storage tank and air compressor.

Q.

You use your tractor for other hauls as well,
do you not1

A.

Oh, yes."

rrhe storage tank and compressor which Mr. Prichard
refers to is the one located at the railhead at Thompson.
It is a stationary tank and cannot be used for transportation. The testimony in this case shows that there will be
need in the near future for in excess of 10 loads of acid
per day to various parts of the state as divergent as San
.Juan and Weber Counties. Even if Prichard's authority
included acid, which it does not, it was error for the Commission to deny petitioner'~ application on the ground
that Prichard had aeid authorit~~. rrhis court has held,
in accordance with the general rule and decisions of other
state and federal courts, that the Commission should look
to future requirements as well as present ones. :--;ee the
ease of Jf1tlcahy, et al. v. Public SerPice Commission, et
aL, 101 Utah 2-t-5, 117 P. 2d 298. In that case the court
stated:
"The statute should be so construed and applied as to encourage rather than retard mechani-
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cal and other improvements in appliances and in
the quality of the service rendered the public ....
and should look to the future as well as the present, providing not only for present urgent needs,
but such as may reasonably be anticizmted from
the probable growth of the population, industry,
and community development." (Emphasis added.)
Since there is no motor carrier authorized to transport acid in the state except petitioner, and inasmuch as
the evidence clearly shows that truck transportation performs a different service from rail transportation, and is
a necessary adjunct to rail transportation, and inasmuch
as a large portion of the state is without rail service of
any kind, we submit that it was error for the Commission
to deny petitioner's application for statewide authority.
The evidence shows that spent acid is available at several
points throughout the state and that this acid is used
in various industries (R. 250, 251) and that new industries requiring the use of acid are coming into being (R.
251). It is not in the public interest to restrict the rights
of petitioner to specific counties or points particularly
where there is no such service available throughout the
state. To require a carrier to make a new application for
each specific point to which service is needed from time
to time, when there are no other authorized carriers in
the state with authority to haul the commodity is an undue burden on the earrier and an abuse of discretion.
There should be sufficient flexibility to allow transportation to new points which will in turn encourage the indus-
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trial growth of the state. \Ve submit that petitioner's
application should have been granted in its entirety and
that Commission's denial of portions thereof was error.
CONCLUSION
Prichard has no authority to transport acid, and the
Commission's denial of petitioner's application on the
ground that he does have, after a finding that public
convenience and necessity require the transportation of
acid h:v motor vehicle, is clearly error. The Commission
enlarged Prichard's rights in an application and on a
showing made by petitioner. Prichard's authority was
enlarged on one of two theories:
1. That some vague previously canceled contract
permit which was not in evidence and which must necessarily have been for a specific unnamt>d product, under
a specific unnamed contract, for a specific unnamed
shipper, could be the basis for the enlargement of Prichard's authority as a common carrier for any acid haul
which originated or terminated in any one of the seven
counties nained in Prichard's authority. Thus the Commission has given Prichard authority to transport acid
to or frmn a,ny point within the state, providing the haul
originates or terminates within one of the named counties. At the same time, after giving such an unwarranted
grant of authority to Prichard, the Commission has resb·icted petitioner's application to specific counties even
though its evidence admittedly shows a need for such
transportation over a rnuch broader area.
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2.

The only other possible ground for the Commis-

sion's action is a construction of Prichard's present authority to include acid. A mere reading of such authority
is conclusive proof that it does not. The Commission recognized this fact and attempted to circun1vent it by adding a footnote in its order to the effect that it may bP
necessary to issue a new order to Prichard; all of tlti ~
action on the Commission's part being done pursuant to
petitioner's application and evidence. That such action
is arbitrary and capricious and clearly error

i~,

we sub-

mit, too clear for argument.
The evidence shows that there is a need for petitioner's services throughout the state, that no other
motor carrier has authority to transport acid, that acid
is used in various industries and the transportation thereof may originate or terminate at various points. The
Commission erred in failing to grant petitioner's application in its entirety.
I

Respectfully submitted,
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON
MARK K. BOYLE

Attorneys for

Petit~oner
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